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COMMENT

P

By C. PETER MAGRATH*

ROFESSOR William Van Alstyne's paper usefully describes
some of the developing law relevant to university relationships
with students and, quite properly, reveals his own values. I say "quite
properly" because, though we are in the area of courts, judges, and
laws, our personal values as university administrators and teachers,
and the policy decisions we make, are major ingredients in the legal
outcomes. I am sympathetic with many of Professor Van Alstyne's
values and much of the counsel he gives. Many campus social codes
are trivial and foolish, and intellectually and politically unworthy
of the time bestowed on enforcing and resisting them. I confess to
little patience with those who believe that decency and morality
depend upon short hair and long skirts, and I have no more patience
with those who claim that liberty hangs in the balance when a school
administrator moves to enforce such codes. The condition of this
world in the last third of the 20th century and, more parochially,
that of the American university confront us with more important
problems.
I agree, too, with most of what Professor Van Alstyne says on
the subject of procedural safeguards in student disciplinary cases.
Not only is the law becoming increasingly clear as to the minimum
due process requirements that must be met when a student faces the
severe sanction of suspension or expulsion, but a student in residence
is similarly, and in my judgment, properly protected by a concept of
privacy that in part derives from the fourth amendment. Two points
come to mind on this matter - the first a warning, the second a
wistful hope. As Professor Van Alstyne notes, the United States
Supreme Court has not yet passed on a student conduct case. If it
ever does, the case may well be a "bad" one from the standpoint of
university administrators - a case, for example, in which state courts
have affirmed the expulsion of a student editor from a university
for a political editorial excoriating the state legislature. Such a case
could well lead to a broad Supreme Court opinion announcing constitutional constraints applicable to all universities in much the same
way that the law of the criminally accused has been significantly influenced by criminal cases involving Negroes in Southern courts in
which the abuses of justice were flagrant. Universities anxious to
avoid excessively detailed, court imposed legal overlays on their
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disciplinary procedures would be well advised to initiate a process
of self-reform.
My second point may strike some as churlish, but I am serious.
Colleges and universities which act in procedurally fair ways and
seek to respect the privacy of their students will be in a stronger
position, both morally and tactically, to isolate those student radicals
who refuse to respect the privacy and the person of deans and presidents. If fourth amendment considerations apply to students, they
presumably apply also to the correspondence and sherry of Grayson
Kirk. It may be premature to ask the American Association of University Professors and the American Civil Liberties Union to draft a
Bill of Rights for deans and presidents, but colleges and universities
which respect the privacy and the individual dignity of their students
will find it easier to demand the same for their administrators and
professors.
Despite my agreement with some of Professor Van Alstyne's
recommendations, I find myself in rather fundamental disagreement
with what I take to be his complete rejection of the private property
and, particularly, the contractual view of the university's relationship
to its students. To be sure, "the 100 percent on-campus/off-campus
description of university jurisdiction will not stand up."' But perhaps if we reduce the percentage to, say, 60 percent, it will. I wholly
agree that universities (and for the sake of convenience we can
bracket the private with the public ones despite certain differences)
are subject to certain constitutional requirements. They must observe
procedural fairness in disciplinary cases that may lead to potentially
severe sanctions; they must respect first amendment freedoms; and
they must not act in racially discriminatory ways. Yet, ultimately,
the university provides an intellectually enriching service for its students on something approaching a contractual basis. It tells the student something like this: if your credentials meet certain standards
we will admit you; if you then satisfactorily complete 32 courses during a residency period of four years, two or three of them in university dormitories subject to certain explicit social rules, we will give
you a baccalaureate degree. The contract is subject to legal and
constitutional limitations, but its contractual features nevertheless
remain. Just as the university must preserve its authority to set academic standards, so too must it retain ultimate authority to deny use
of its facilities - academic, cultural, and residential - to those who,
having been clearly and explicitly warned, reject its basic rules.
Admittedly, a comprehensive contract theory of the studentuniversity relationship in a strictly legal sense is untenable. Prospective students do not bargain with an institution they may wish to
I Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45
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attend over a whole spectrum of mutually enforceable terms. Moreover, it is difficult for students to compel a university to deliver the
general educational promises contained in its catalog, though universities which, as a matter of explicit institutional policy, promise to
observe specified procedural safeguards in disciplinary cases can
very probably be legally compelled to observe such procedures. Presumably, too, a student who completed a university's degree requirements and was then arbitrarily denied his degree -because of the
color of his eyes or his skin, or because he verbally attacked the university president as an establishment scoundrel -would have an
actionable case in the courts. What seems to me to be relevant is
that, in a broad sense, a contractual relationship exists between students and their universities. To be sure, the university is a disproportionately "strong" partner in the contract, but this is a natural
consequence of the fact that admission to a university is not an inherent, automatic right open to any person. Undergraduate students
are junior colleagues, not coequal partners, in the educational venture.
These comments may seem abstract, but they are directly relevant
to those student disciplinary cases that arise when students challenge
established university policies through physical obstruction.
My basic position is that, notwithstanding the many rights that
the students ought to be accorded, a qualified contractual view of the
student's relationship to the institution provides a reasonable description of what is involved. The commonsense view was summed up
well in a recent New York Times editorial commenting favorably on
the firm actions taken by the administrations at the University of
Chicago, the University of Denver, and Roosevelt University during
the spring of 1968 to counter lawless trespass by protesting students:
The right to attend a university is a privilege. Those who
abuse that privilege by striking at the freedom of the university
have no just cause for complaint if their misconduct leads to actual
or threatened 2expulsion from the community whose rules they refuse to accept.
Professor Van Alstyne and I agree that many conflicts over dress
and coiffure are foolish, but I wonder if the sartorial examples he
has chosen really go to the heart of the issue. He comments, "Unless
adventures in campus caparisons reach such exaggerated proportions
and unless material evidence is forthcoming that freakish fashions
are actually disrupting classes or otherwise directly interfering with
the academic program.., we may indeed presume too far on the
private lives of our students by regimenting their tastes." 3 It is possible, of course, to take the attitude of the aristocratic English lady
who said that she did not care what people did, so long as they did
2
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not do it in the streets and frighten the horses. But where does this
leave universities that hope to prevent students from performing
acts of sexual intimacy in the residential units or from smoking
marijuana or consuming alcohol in their rooms? Professor Van Alstyne, speaking as a lawyer, concedes that universities may legally
extract sartorial conformity from students. Therefore, I assume he
would agree that universities can, subject to explicit rules and procedurally fair disciplinary proceedings, attempt to regulate in the
area of drugs, liquor, and sexual relations. Such regulations often
follow the iegal codes of municipalities and states, though it is worth
noting that the precise meaning of the legal code is not always clear.
Professor Van Alstyne is generally unsympathetic to subjecting students to multiple disciplinary sanctions for violating on-campus rules
that duplicate the regulations of public governments. He admits,
however, that certain public rules may also serve certain legitimate
interests of the university. Once again, I share his desire to qualify
as much as possible the double or multiple jeopardy situations. I am
afraid, however, that his rejection of the distinction between the student as resident and the student as citizen and of the qualified contractual analogy may lead to more difficult problems than the ones
he hopes to solve.
If the university cannot function in a contractual relationship
to its students, especially with regard to their on-campus behavior,
and if public laws on such matters as drugs, liquor, and sexual relationships are to be enforced by the police, is this not likely to create
an academically and socially unhealthy atmosphere on the campuses?
The problems raised by the issue of undercover police and police informers on some campuses in recent months suggests the difficulties.
While I too am annoyed at the granting of special dispensations to
students fortunate enough to be in college (and this, in my judgment,
is much more common than their suffering from allegedly cruel
double jeopardy situations), I think it essential to insist that, to a
limited but nevertheless significant extent, the university and its
premises are a sanctuary. It is, if you will, an ivory tower that ought
normally to be offlimits to both political pressures and police intrusions. This policy can only be implemented if universities respect the
general public laws by moving, for example, against students who
illegally possess and consume marijuana. As a matter of fact, it
seems to me that a university can function both realistically and humanely in situations of this kind. When, for example, a student
appears to be a ringleader in selling the substance for gain, the police
authorities can be invited to undertake an investigation that will lead
to criminal prosecution; this need not be done in a manner that violates the presumed offender's constitutional rights. When a student
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is caught experimenting with the substance, it may be far more appropriate to invoke the university's milder disciplinary machinery,
or perhaps even to attempt counselling for a minor first offender.
Finally, let me turn briefly to Professor Van Alstyne's comments
on the subject of crime and punishment. He describes expulsion from
the university as "an academic death penalty" equivalent to the death
penalty in the criminal law.4 I find this analogy unpersuasive. Admittedly, it deprives the penalized student of something valuable. It
is, moreover, a last resort and must not be sought except for the most
serious violation of major university rules. However, it is not any
more a death penalty than expulsion for failing to meet academic
standards. Suspension for one or two semesters, with a procedure by
which a student may reapply for admission by presenting evidence
of his new maturity and his heightened sense of community responsibilities, is, I believe, the most appropriate sanction in most serious

disciplinary violations. Suspension is a lesser part of expulsion, and
the latter is the only sanction that makes all others effective.
Professor Van Alstyne's comment about "unimaginative" university sanctions may be less a reflection on the intellectual qualities
of administrators than on certain practical realities. The hard truth
is that there are scarcely any sanctions available short of the Draconian ones of suspension or expulsion, and my experience is that
they are so severe that they are rarely used. I do not see the denial
of bowling alley privileges at a student union, the imposition of a
physical chore, or the "campusing" of students as very useful alternatives. These proposed sanctions are either impractical or meaningless, as in the recent attempt to punish Linda LeClair of Barnard
College fame by denying her access to a school cafeteria. Campusing
students or denying them social privileges in large and irreducibly
impersonal universities could only be made effective by an army of
enforcers. I fear that the ensuing climate and the constant checking
on the restricted students would indeed be a step toward the 1984
atmosphere that Professor Van Alstyne abhors.
Further, I do not see much promise in his other punishment
alternatives. Certainly, universities must rely heavily on counselling
students who abuse their bodies - whether with drugs, with liquor,
or sexually - but to require it, as Van Alstyne suggests, would be
disastrous. In the first place, persons do not respond positively
to compulsory counselling; the individual must first want it and
thus be receptive to the counsel. Secondly, turning university counselling services into an arm of the disciplinary system would severely
compromise the integrity of the medical and psychiatric staff, who
cannot function effectively if students perceive them as dependent
41d.
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adjuncts of a dean's office. There is more to be said for demanding
monetary restitution of students who damage property, though it
is often hard to assign responsibility, and the sanction has little effect
on wealthy students. Requiring students to work off damages (or
perhaps even other offenses) seems appealing, but many university
offices do not like to use what they call "slave labor." Furthermore,
how does one measure the quality of such work performed under
compulsion? Expulsion from a dormitory may be a viable sanction
in certain situations; yet it is tantamount to allowing a student who
refuses to accept legitimate university rules to be freed of them. I
am not sure that this is the way to develop a sense of responsibility
for the rights of others. In any event, I dissent strongly from Professor Van Alstyne's view that suspension or expulsion is "tired,
harsh, and inessential." 5 It is harsh (especially expulsion), and it
should be used cautiously; but, it is essential, both legally and practically.
I want to end on a more positive note by sketching, very briefly,
another view of the university's legal status. University property is
technically either public or private, but in either instance it performs
essentially public functions. It does so, with regard to students, on
a contractual basis, but that contract is subject to legal and constitutional limitations. Universities, if they are to function as centers
of independent criticism and unregimented teaching and learning,
must be accorded the broad privileges of academic freedom; their
"privateness," in other words, must be secure. Most analogies dealing with human institutions must be used carefully, for the institutions that are analogized usually have differing histories and operate
within unique contexts. Nonetheless, used with care, an analogy can
quicken understanding, serving as a sort of intellectual shorthand
for the detailed inquiry that should follow. In my view, universities
in their legal and political capacity are best understood as public
service corporations with special privileges and special responsibilities. In their relationships to students, particularly on-campus,
they exercise quasi-governmental powers, subject to basic constitutional limitations and to the laws of the jurisdictions in which they
are situated. They must seek to engender respect for the laws which
the public communities cherish, particularly when those laws have
relevance to the special academic purposes of the residential university. In return, the university is privileged to enjoy the benefits of
academic freedom for its scholars, teachers, and students.

5
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